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Abstract 
Online reviews have become proposed as useful information for consumers to make 
decision. Meanwhile, review manipulation will weaken the credibility of online 
reviews. Except manipulating the review text and rating, we propose that review 
helpfulness, an important signal for consumer to filter the reviews, could also be 
manipulated. This study thus explores the existence of review helpfulness 
manipulation and the relationship between firm quality and review manipulation. 
Based on a dataset from a review forum in www.wdzj.com which is the leading and 
largest portal of peer to peer lending industry in China, we get the following 
interesting results. First, due to the manipulation of review helpfulness, a 
manipulated positive review is more likely to receive higher helpfulness, while a 
manipulated negative is more likely to get lower helpfulness. Second, a manipulated 
review tends to be lower quality in terms of readability and word count, which are 
found as positive predictors for review helpfulness. Third, high quality firms tend to 
manipulate more positive reviews, and at the same time high quality firms will 
receive more negative manipulated reviews. This study extends current understanding 
about online review manipulation, thereby providing theoretical and practice 
implications.  
Keywords: review manipulation, review helpfulness, review quality, firm quality 
 
Introduction 
Online review forums like Yelp (www.yelp.com) and Dianping (www.dianping.com) offer new 
channels for consumers to communicate and express their opinions on a product (Cheung and Thadani, 
2012). Expressing electronic WOM could satisfy consumers’ desire for social interaction and 
economic incentives, express their concern for other consumers, and have the potential to enhance 
their own self-worth. Some studies in marketing and electronic commerce literature indicate that 
online reviews of product or service could acts as a signal of product quality which will help 
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consumers make better choices (Wang and Yu, 2015). However, other scholars also question the 
informativeness of online reviews, as the online reviews might be manipulated by the firms (Hu et al., 
2011a).  
Following Hu et al. (2011a), we define the review manipulation (or fraud) as occurring when online 
firms, publishers, or even their competitors write “consumers” reviews by posing as real customers. 
Reviews manipulation has been identified as a popular practice in music industry in which 
professional marketers are hired to post positive comments about new albums in many online forums 
(Mayzlin 2006). Such practice also exists in famous electronic commerce giant like Amazon. For 
instance, Harmon (2004) shows that a proportion of book reviews were written by the books’ own 
publishers, authors, and competitors.  
Online review manipulation also gained much attention from scholars and online forum operators 
(e.g., Dellarocas 2006; Hu et al., 2012). Specifically, diverse manipulation detection methods have 
been developed. For example, Wald–Wolfowitz (Runs) test was proposed by Hu et al. (2012) to test 
whether or not the reviews for a product follows a random manner, which implies that a non-random 
pattern indicates the existence of manipulation. Some online forums operators also try to develop 
technologies or governance mechanisms to increase the cost of review manipulation, thereby reducing 
firms conduct review manipulation (Dellarocas 2006). 
Most of the studies on review manipulation focus on the review rating, readability, and sentiments 
(e.g., Hu et al., 2012). Current research assumes that helpfulness of reviews is an indicator for the 
existence of review manipulation. For example, Hu et al. (2011b) suggest that books whose reviews 
on an average are rated as highly helpful can serve as a non-manipulation indicator. In this study, we 
make a competing proposition that if the helpfulness is manipulated it will not works as a signal for 
non-manipulation.  
The possible manipulation of the review helpfulness is worthy of investigation for several reasons. 
First, most of the forums offer a button asking the users “was this review helpful for you?”, which 
could help subsequent consumers filter informative ones (Korfiatis et al., 2012). It is easier for a 
manipulator to vote for his/her review by clicking that button. Second, the manipulation of review 
helpfulness make it is not a valid measurement of the true helpfulness of a review. Thus, researchers 
should be cautious to use the raw data of review helpfulness like the ratio of the helpful votes over the 
total number of votes as a variable in the research model (e.g., Korfiatis et al., 2012).  
The helpful or non-helpful votes of online reviews may come from two sources – true consumers and 
the manipulators who pose that review. As a result, a fraud review gets helpfulness votes in two ways. 
First, the potential true users may give positive or negative votes for the review as in most cases they 
cannot distinguish the source of review (Dellarocas 2006). So, in order to identify the existence of 
helpfulness manipulation, we need to distinguish the effects of helpfulness manipulation and the 
quality of review which affecting true users’ votes. Therefore, our first research question is as follows: 
R1: Does a manipulated review affect its helpfulness by means of the mediating role of text quality. 
Second, the manipulator directly or indirectly gives positive votes for the review posted by his/her self. 
For example, the manipulator could register in the online forum as another users and directly provide 
helpful votes. Except directly manipulating helpfulness, the manipulator could offer money to hire 
other marketers to give positive votes. To study whether or not the helpfulness manipulation exists, 
we empirically study the following research questions:  
R2: Does firm directly manipulate the helpfulness of online reviews? 
Finally, we will further study what types of firms are more likely to have manipulated online reviews 
and helpfulness. Specifically, “have” here means that manipulated reviews may be the positive 
comments come from firm itself or the negative comments given by its competitors. Extant research 
shows that, for the market like music and books where prices are essentially exogenously fixed, low 
quality firm manipulate its ratings of reviews more than the high firm (Dellarocas 2006; Hu et al., 
2011a). Dellarocas (2006) also proposes that in a duopoly setting where prices are endogenous, if the 
marginal revenues gains are increasing function of consumers’ beliefs about the firm’s quality, the 
 Manipulation of review helpfulness 
  
 Twenty-Third Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, China 2019  
high quality firm will manipulate more than the low quality firm. However, we find that few empirical 
researches have shown that the manipulation intensity of high quality firm is higher. The peer to peer 
(P2P) lending industry may offer a setting that the service price could be endogenous set, which could 
enable us to empirically test whether or not the high quality financing service provider will 
manipulate more. In addition, competitors may post offensive negative review, i.e., manipulated 
reviews, to defame the high quality firm. To uncover the manipulation behavior of different types of 
firm, we will empirically study the following two questions: 
R3: Are high quality or low quality firms are more likely to manipulate positive reviews? 
R4: Are high quality firms are more likely to receive manipulated negative reviews? 
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops hypotheses. Then the methodology part 
presents the research framework, data and measurement. The results part shows the answers to the 
research questions. Finally, we conclude the paper with discussion, limitation and furfure research 
directions. 
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Development 
The conceptual model is developed as figure 1. Research unit in this study is individual review. The 
variable review helpfulness refers the ratio of number of helpful vote a review receive divided by the 
total number of votes. The model in figure 1 shows that whether or not a review is manipulated have 
effects on helpfulness through direct and indirect mediating routes. Additionally, firm quality is 
proposed as an antecedent of manipulation. 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Model 
Mediating Role of Review Quality 
The quality of online review is operationalized as text readability and word counts (Korfiatis et al., 
2012). Readability refers to the cognitive effort required for a person to comprehend a piece of text 
(Zakaluk and Samuels, 1988). Words count, as the term implies, is the total number of words in a 
review. To study the mediating roles of review quality, we need to test whether or not manipulation 
has significant effect on review quality, and at the same time review quality affects review helpfulness. 
According to prior research, a piece of review written in a easy to follow manner will be recognized 
as more useful review by true consumers, who may give positive votes (Korfiatis et al., 2012). In 
addition, review depth (word count) has been proved having a positive effect on the helpfulness of the 
review (Mudambi and Schuff, 2010). So, we make the following hypothesis:  
H1: Review quality (readability and words count) will improve its helpfulness.  
Prior studies suggest that a fraud review is less readable than a true review (Ong, 2013). For example, 
Moffitt and Burns (2009) find that fraudulent financial reports are more likely to contain more 
complex words than the normal ones. One possible reason is that a manipulator who writes a fraud 
review will try to confuse others by using complex sentence. As for total words count, the 
manipulator might be unwilling to make efforts write a large piece of text. Thus, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
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H2: A manipulated review tends to be of lower text quality. 
Manipulation of Review Helpfulness 
To filter low quality online review, most of the forums motive users to vote for the review’s 
helpfulness. We agree with Hu et al. (2011b) that if review helpfulness is not manipulated, it can 
serve as an indicator of non-manipulation of review. However, we must be caution that, to enable a 
manipulated review become “useful”, the manipulator will be prone to give positive vote directly or 
hire others to vote for their reviews, thereby increasing their fraud reviews’ influence. Additionally, 
compared with high quality fake review, manipulating review helpfulness is easier and cost less. 
Therefore, we make the following hypothesis:  
H3: A manipulated review is more likely to receive higher helpfulness due to the manipulation of 
review helpfulness. 
Firm Quality and Reviews Manipulation 
In the market like books, low quality firm manipulates its ratings of reviews more than the high 
quality firm (Hu et al., 2011a). The research context in our study is P2P lending which is a type of 
lending that enables people to make direct borrow and lend via an online platform (Lin et al., 2013). 
Unlike the traditional market like music and books where prices are essentially exogenously fixed, the 
service fees are endogenous in P2P lending platforms. In addition, compared with the hotel industry 
(Zhuang et al., 2018), consumers can hardly get firm’s quality information offline. Thus, manipulation 
of online review has greater effect on consumers’ perception of P2P lending platform. In this market, 
the high quality firms tend to manipulate more, which could accentuates the gap between the ratings 
of the low quality competitors and itself. So, higher intensity of manipulation from high quality firms 
could help investors distinguish the high P2P lending platform, thereby increasing high quality firm’s 
revenue (Dellarocas 2006). So we expect that high quality firms tend to manipulate more positive 
reviews. However, the competition among P2P lending platforms also brings more negative fraud 
reviews from competitors. Hence, we make the following two hypotheses:  
H4: High quality firms tend to manipulate more positive reviews. 
H5: High quality firms will receive more negative manipulated review. 
Methodology 
Data 
We collect our data from WDZJ (www.wdzj.com), which is the leading and largest portal of online 
lending industry in China. It provides all-round and authoritative data of P2P lending platforms in 
China. All P2P lending platforms are ranked by the WDZJ based on its transactions volume. Except, 
the lending and loan information, consumers’ discussion forum can also give reviews to each platform.  
In our study, data on every platform available was gathered automatically with a self-developed web 
crawler to retrieve forum data. Our forum data covers about 5 years from October 2014 to August 
2018, including 202,667 reviews from users among 6276 platforms. Firstly, in our dataset we only 
include the platforms that receive more than 20 reviews. In addition, the replies of each review are 
excluded in our data analysis. After removing those platforms and replies, 140,007 review and 738 
platforms were left. In addition, some platforms do not have any performance information reported in 
WDZJ. As the performance data is used as proxy for firms’ quality, so finally there are 88,973 
reviews and 293 platforms were included in the dataset.  
Specially, we will introduce what the review information look like in the review forum of WDZJ. 
Besides the user’s information, a review in WDZJ forum consists of three parts: numerical 
expressions (helpful votes, helpless votes, numerical ratings which is between 1 to 5 of four 
dimensions of service quality), an overall evaluation indicating whether or not the reviewer like to 
recommend the P2P lending platform to other users, and the textual comments about the platform. 
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Figure 2 shows a review posted on WDZJ. The sum of the four ratings of speed, guard, website 
experience, and service is used as the total rating of the platform. 
 
Figure 2 An example of review posted on WDZJ 
Review Manipulation Detection 
The research unit in our study is the individual review. Thus, firstly we must detect whether or not 
one review is manipulated. As Wald–Wolfowitz (Runs) test or time series method works for detection 
non-random pattern of all reviews for one product or firm (Hu et al., 2012), we do not adopt that 
approach. Instead, we try to develop multiply rules to label the review as normal or abnormal. 
Abnormal review here can be considered as manipulated ones.  
We designed three categories of rules to detect abnormal reviews that may be manipulated. As long as 
a review satisfies at least one rule, we label it as a suspected manipulated one. The rules and number 
of reviews identified based on the rules are listed in Table 1. Finally, we identified 12,201 suspected 
manipulated reviews out of 140,007 total reviews. 
Table 1. Manipulation Detection Rules 
Categories Description Specific rules # Manipulated 
reviews 
Rules based 
on reviewer 
Reviews with extreme ratings (all 
five stars) are highly likely to be 
fraud reviews (Heydari et al., 2016). 
The user who gives high (low) 
overall rating for all of the 
platforms on which they post 
reviews is suspicious to manipulate 
the reviews. Thus, we label all the 
reviews posted by this kind of 
reviewer as suspected manipulated. 
User gives 20 of total rating 
for all of the platforms on 
which they post reviews. 
110 
User gives 4 of total rating 
for all of the platforms on 
which they post reviews. 
160 
The similarity of all reviews posted 
by the reviewer is above a certain 
threshold. 
The similarity of all reviews 
posted by the reviewer is 
above 0.9 
1876 
When a user releases review on 
multiple platforms, only one 
platform has lower overall rating. 
Users’ rating for platform 
above 16 is viewed as high 
rating, lower than 8 as low 
rating. 
868 
Unusually active users are more 
likely to write abnormal reviews 
which are manipulated by the P2P 
lending platform; we take the 
reviews this user released on this 
certain platform as suspected 
The number of reviews a 
user has wrote is above 
3(95% quantile), with a low 
standard deviation 
0.707(33% quantile) of total 
ratings in 21 days on a 
2042 
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manipulated reviews. certain platform. 
The text similarity of users' 
reviews on a certain platform 
all above 0.7 
1367 
Rules based 
on platform 
The textual similarity of the 
platform’s reviews is above a 
certain threshold. 
The text similarities of a 
platform's reviews are all 
above 0.7 
13 
Extreme large (small) mean and 
small (large) variance of all 
reviews’ total rating on the 
platform. 
If mean of a platform’s rating 
above 16 and standard 
deviation lower than 
3.83(60% quantile), or mean 
of platform’s rating lower 
than 13 and standard 
deviation above than 
3.83(70% quantile) 
101 
Rules based 
on review 
If a review has high (low) total 
rating but the overall evaluation is 
non-recommended (recommend), 
we regard this comment as a 
suspected manipulated review. 
If the overall evaluation of a 
review is recommend (not 
recommend) but the total 
rating is 4 (20). 
3235 
Higher text similarity between two 
reviews, more likely both the 
review is manipulated (Zhao et al., 
2013). So the second rule of reviews 
is: if text similarity between two 
reviews is greater than a certain 
threshold, both reviews are 
abnormal. 
If the text similarity of the 
two reviews is greater than 
0.9. 
5117 
Total   12201 
Measurement 
All the key variables used in the research model are listed in Table 2.  
Table 2 Definition of Variables 
 Variables Description  
Review helpfulness review_helfulness_ratio The ratio of helpful votes of a review. 
manipulation is_abnormal 1 if a review is manipulated and 0 otherwise 
review readability average_word_length Average Chinese character of each Chinese word 
average_sentence_length Average Chinese word count in each sentence 
review depth review_word_count The number of total of Chinese words in a review 
Platform quality shareholder_Soccontroll
ed_coded 
1 if state-owned enterprises hold shares in the 
platform and 0 otherwise 
registered_capital Registered capital of the platform 
avg_volume Average daily volume of turnover in the past year 
Control variables is_recommend 1 if a review is positive and 0 if a review is 
negative 
review_duration The number of days between releasement and 
crawling. 
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Review manipulation and helpfulness  
The dummy variable is_abnormal refers whether or not the review is manipulated. To get the 
dependent variable review_helpfulness_ratio, we divide its total number of votes by its total number 
of helpful votes for each review (Korfiatis et al., 2012). 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠
 
Review quality 
Text readability refers cognitive effort required for a person to comprehend a piece of text (Zakaluk 
and Samuels, 1988). The popular readability index like ARI (Automated Readability Index) is for a 
typical English language text (Senter and Smith, 1967).  
𝐴𝑅𝐼 = 4.71 × (
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
) + 0.5 × (
𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
) − 21.43 
As for readability of Chinese text, we calculate two variables defined as follows. 
average_word_length and average_sentence_length and review_word_count for each review (Chen et 
al., 2018). Reviews with small average_word_length and average_sentence_length are more readable. 
Besides, the larger word count means high text depth which contain more information. 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
 
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ =  
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠
 
Firm quality 
We use three proxy variables to measure the quality of the P2P lending platforms. Avg_volume is the 
average daily loan volume in the past year of the P2P lending platform. Resitered_capital is registered 
capital at the founding of the platform. Shareholder_Soccontrolled_coded is a dummy variable that 
shows whether the state-owned enterprises hold the shares of the platform. 
Control variables 
Our research model also includes two control variables. The first control variable is_recommend 
refers to the overall evaluation of the review indicating whether the reviewer would like to 
recommend the P2P lending platform to others. This variable is coded as 1 if it is positive and 0 if 
negative. To answer research question 4 and 5, the dataset is split as positive reviews and negative 
reviews. The second control variable review_duration refers to how long a review has been posted in 
the forum. The longer a review is presented, the more likely it is to get more helpful votes (Siering et 
al., 2018). 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are listed in table 3, which shows that the suspected manipulated 
reviews account for about 9% of the total reviews and 60 percentages of the reviews get overall 
recommend evaluations (i.e., positive).  
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Count Mean Std Min 50% Max 
review_helfulness_ratio 88973 0.506763 0.454365 0 0.5 1 
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review_duration (Day) 88973 222.7072 182.4132 2 193 1383 
registered_capital (10000 Yuan 
RMB) 
88973 10006.18 12309.43 500 10000 250000 
avg_volume (10000 Yuan RMB) 88973 4134.874 6391.153 5.1003 1295.425 368658 
average_sentence_length 88973 16.85864 11.47258 0.0556 14 185 
review_word_count 88973 11.69719 8.624103 0 9 128 
average_word_length 88973 1.679393 0.20903 1 1.66667 21 
 Dummy variables (percentage) 
 1 0     
Shareholder_Soccontrolled_coded 95.55% 0.45%     
is_abnormal 8.67% 91.33%     
is_recommend (positive or negative) 67.24% 32.76%     
 
Results 
Descriptive evidence 
Before answering the research questions using path analysis, we presented some relevant 
descriptive evidence of the manipulation of review helpfulness. The reviews are grouped by 
attitude (positive or negative) and manipulation (manipulated or normal). Thus, we get four 
groups shown in figure 3. Firstly, we depict the mean helpfulness for each group. As we can 
see, the positive manipulated reviews are most useful (mean ratio= 0.569), and the negative 
manipulated reviews are most useless (mean ratio = 0.485). So, we suspect that one possible 
reason is that P2P lending platform will upvote its manipulated positive reviews and 
downvote the fraud negative reviews it receives. 
 
Figure 3 Helpfulness Ratios and Review Groups  
To see if there is significant difference in review helpfulness ratio between groups, we perform 
ANOVA(One-way analysis of variance) on four groups (Fisher, 1918). As our data, helpfulness ratio, 
does not meet the homogeneity of variances assumption, so we run the Games Howell post hoc test to 
test the differences between groups (Ruxton and Beauchamp, 2008). As showed in the table 4, the 
helpfulness of manipulated positive reviews is significant greater than other three kinds. The 
manipulated negative reviews get the lowest helpfulness. 
0.569  
0.497  0.485  
0.515  
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
manipulated
positive
normal
positive
manipulated
negative
normal
negative
helpfulness ratio 
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Table 4 Games Howell Post Hoc Test 
(I) kind_cat (J) kind_cat Mean difference 
(I-J) 
Standard 
error 
Significant 
manipulated positive normal negative 0.054 .007 .000 
manipulated negative 0.084 .011 .000 
normal positive 0.072 .006 .000 
normal negative manipulated positive -0.054 .007 .000 
manipulated negative 0.030 .010 .009 
normal positive 0.018 .003 .000 
manipulated 
negative 
manipulated positive -0.084 .011 .000 
normal negative -0.030 .010 .009 
normal positive -0.013 .010 .544 
normal positive manipulated positive -0.072 .006 .000 
normal negative -0.018 .003 .000 
manipulated negative 0.013 .010 .544 
Hypotheses testing  
We adopt the path analysis to test the hypotheses. Path analysis was developed around 1918 by 
geneticist Sewall Wright, who wrote about it more extensively in the 1920s (Wright, 1921). It has 
since been applied to a vast array of complex modeling areas, including biology, psychology, 
sociology, and econometrics (Dodge, 2003). Path analysis can be viewed as a special case of 
structural equation modeling (SEM), in other words, path analysis is SEM with a structural model but 
no measurement model. 
Mediating Role of Review Quality 
As shown in Table 5, both average sentence length and review word count have a significant direct 
effect on review helpfulness ratio (coefficient=-0.00186, p<0.01 and coefficient=0.00687, p<0.01), 
while the effect of average word length is not significant, suggesting support H1. We find that 
manipulation (is_abnormal) has a significant positive direct effect on average word length and 
average sentence length (coefficient=14.96, p<0.01 and coefficient=1.694, p<0.01), but the direct 
effect is negative for review word count (coefficient=-1.393, p<0.01). This result suggests that a 
manipulated review tends to have longer sentence length and word length, but fewer words. So, H2 is 
supported.  Table 6 suggests that the mediating effect on review helpfulness ratio in the path is 
significantly negative (coefficient=-0.024428, p<0.01), further indicates that manipulated review has 
lower review quality, leading to a lower review helpfulness ratio.  
Table 5 Path Analysis Result 
Hypothesis Path Direct 
H1 average_sentence_length --> review_helpfulness_ratio -0.00186*** 
(0.000170) 
average_word_length --> review_helpfulness_ratio 0.00764 (0.00729) 
review_word_count --> review_helpfulness_ratio 0.00687***(0.000225) 
H2 is_abnormal --> average_sentence_length 14.96***(0.227) 
is_abnormal --> average_word_length 1.694***(0.0184) 
is_abnormal --> review_word_count -1.393***(0.103) 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
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Table 6 Mediating Role of Review Quality 
Path Mediator s Indirect Direct Total 
is_abnormal --> 
review_helpfulness_
ratio 
average_sentence_length 
average_word_length 
review_word_count 
-0.024428*** 
(0.0008335) 
0.04002*** 
(0.005382) 
0.015594*** 
(0.0054465) 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Manipulation of Review Helpfulness 
After controlling the mediating effects of review quality, we will test the existence of direct 
manipulation of review helpfulness. The results in table 6 show that the direct effect of manipulation 
on helpfulness is positively significant (coefficient=0.04, p<0.001). So, H3 is supported if we run the 
model with complete dataset. However, if we spit the dataset as positive reviews and negative reviews 
and run the model separately, it turns out that manipulation has a positive effect on helpfulness as for 
positive review (coefficient=0.0610, p<0.001), while it has negative effect on helpfulness for negative 
review (coefficient=-0.0232, p<0.001) (see table 7). So, only the positive manipulated review is more 
likely to receive higher helpfulness due to the manipulation of review helpfulness. Thus, H3 is 
partially supported. Meanwhile, the firm may manipulate to reduce the negative review helpfulness. 
Firm Quality and Reviews Manipulation 
In order to answer research question 4 and 5, we divided the data set into two datasets, positive review 
and negative review. The results in table 7 indicate that high quality firms tend to manipulate more 
positive reviews (coefficient=0.00000294, p<0.001). So H4 is supported. It also suggest that high 
quality firms will receive more negative manipulated review (coefficient=0.000000549,p<0.01). 
Hence, H5 is supported. 
Table 7 Path Analysis for Positive and Negative Reviews 
Relationships Positive reviews Negative reviews 
is_abnormal<— 
shareholder_soccontrolled_coded 0.00229 
(0.00536) 
0.0106 
(0.00919) 
registered_capital -0.000000118 
(0.000000102) 
0.000000108 
(0.000000120) 
avg_volume 0.00000294*** 
(0.000000203) 
0.000000549** 
(0.000000225) 
average_sentence_length<— 
is_abnormal 14.71*** 
(0.262) 
15.57*** 
(0.443) 
review_helpfulness_ratio<— 
is_abnormal 0.0610*** 
(0.00654) 
-0.0232** 
(0.00947) 
average_sentence_length -0.00307*** 
(0.000230) 
-0.000117 
(0.000245) 
average_word_length 0.0132 
(0.00948) 
-0.00992 
(0.0112) 
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review_word_count 0.00828*** 
(0.000322) 
0.00500*** 
(0.000304) 
review_duration -0.000282*** 
(0.0000104) 
-0.0000358*** 
(0.0000137) 
average_word_length<— 
is_abnormal 1.697*** 
(0.0217) 
1.686*** 
(0.0347) 
review_word_count<— 
is_abnormal -1.271*** 
(0.108) 
-1.467*** 
(0.228) 
N 59824 29149 
Notes: standard error in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
A summary of hypotheses testing was displayed in the table 8. 
Table 8 Hypotheses Testing Summary 
Hypotheses Result 
H1: Review quality (readability and words count) will improve its helpfulness Supported 
H2: A manipulated review tends to be of lower text quality. Supported 
H3: A manipulated review is more likely to receive higher helpfulness due to 
the manipulation of review helpfulness. 
Partially 
supported 
H4: high quality firms tend to manipulate more positive reviews. Supported 
H5: high quality firms will receive more negative manipulated review. Supported 
 
Conclusions 
This paper examines the existence of review helpfulness manipulation and the relationship between 
firm quality and review manipulation. Using the archival data from the P2P lending forum in China, 
we conduct a path analysis to assess the manipulation’s direct and indirect effects on helpfulness. We 
get three main findings as follows. First, because of helpfulness manipulation, a manipulated positive 
review is more likely to receive higher helpfulness, while a manipulated negative review is more 
likely to get lower helpfulness. Second, a manipulated review tends to be lower quality in terms of 
readability and word count, which could improve review helpfulness. Third, high quality firms tend to 
manipulate more positive reviews. In addition, high quality firms will receive more negative 
manipulated review from its competitors.  
These findings shed lights on the areas of online review manipulation and P2P lending market. In 
addition, as helpfulness of review can be manipulated by firms, the usefulness data based on the 
number of users’ votes may be not a valid measurement of the true helpfulness of online review. So, 
future research should develop alternative measure of the true helpfulness of online reviews, and 
investigate how much the helpfulness votes affecting subsequent consumers’ decisions.   
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